Oil Fields as Military Objectives: A Feasibility Study

U.S., Congress, Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations
Report Prepared by the Congressional Research Service, 94th Congress
1st session - August 21, 1975

ABSTRACT
The possible use of U.S. military force to occupy foreign oil fields in exigency first surfaced as a serious issue in January 1975. This paper provides perspective, so that the Congress if need be could participate most meaningfully in deliberations to determine the desirability and feasibility of any such action.

Analysis indicates that sustained sanctions by all or most of OPEC's members would disrupt America's fundamental lifestyle and degrade U.S. security, although survival would never be at stake. By way of contrast, the vital interests of our major allies could quickly be compromised.

Any decision to ease agonies at home and (if need be) assist allies would be conditioned by political, economic, social, legal, and moral factors, but if nonmilitary facets were entirely favorable, successful operations would be assured only if this country could satisfy all aspects of a five-part mission:

--Seize required oil installations intact.
--Secure them for weeks, months, or years.
--Restore wrecked assets rapidly.
--Operate all installations without the owner's assistance.
--Guarantee safe overseas passage for supplies and petroleum products.

American abilities to cope with steps one through four would be suspect if sabotage were the only serious threat. U.S. parachute assault forces are too few to cover all objectives quickly. Amphibious forces are too slow. Skilled teams could wreak havoc before we arrived. →